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Abstract 
This report explores patterns of technology upgrading as a three-dimensional process which consists of (i) 
intensity of technology upgrading, (ii) structural change, and (iii) interaction with the global economy. The 
specificity of our report is that we depict patterns of technology upgrading by relying entirely on patent data. 
We derive patent indicators to capture the three dimensions. 
Patent indicators for intensity of technology upgrading trace technological capabilities at the technology 
frontier (transnational patents) and behind the technology frontier (domestic/resident direct applications to 
national offices). Structural change in technological knowledge is depicted by the share of transnational patent 
applications in high technology fields and knowledge-intensive activities and by calculating a technological 
diversification index. To capture interaction with global economy in the upgrading process indicators measure 
technological knowledge sourcing across countries and interactions between foreign and indigenous actors. 
Based on 7 patent indicators covering the three upgrading dimensions the comparative analysis focuses on 
EU27 and its subregions and on the BRICS countries.  
According to the results, in 2011 CEECs were quite homogenous in their upgrading paths. A typical CEE 
economy in 2011 is well behind EU12 in terms of frontier technology intensity, domestic technology intensity, 
share of high tech patents and technology sourcing abroad. Moreover, its organizational capabilities are often 
less advanced.  The CEE profile is much less coherent in terms of technology diversification/specialization and 
share of joint inventions. However, differences among CEECs are not significant. Still there are some notable 
national features. Poland, Romania and Slovenia have above average domestic technological intensity which 
reflects partly their sizes (Romania and Poland) and specific model of innovation system reliant on domestic 
R&D intensive firms (Slovenia). Latvia and Lithuania are specific in terms of high share of HTKI patents. 
CEE technology upgrading as depicted by patents is within the BRIC pattern (with exception of China which in 
terms of technology upgrading has de facto delinked from BRICS). In the BRIC context, the CEE characterize 
very open innovation system with a high share of coinventions and foreign actors exploiting local inventions. 
This reveals weak organizational capabilities to commercialize its own inventions. 
According to the results CEE grew during 1990s/2008 based on production, not technological capability. Their 
future growth will increasingly depend on building technological capabilities at world frontier level.  Our 
analysis shows that the basis for such growth exists only to a limited extent and that speed of upgrading 
towards world frontier activities is well beyond required for catching up. Equally, our analysis shows that 
solutions for improved technology upgrading will need to be found with their existing innovation model of 
small open economies integrated into the EU. 
  
 2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this report we explore issues related to technology upgrading of the European Union (EU) 
peripheral economies, especially of the new EU member states1. Technology upgrading is the key to 
further long-term growth as suggested by the growth literature. This has been already recognised by 
the EU policy agenda which has promoted Smart Specialization Strategies (SSS) as the ex-ante 
conditionality for use of the EU Structural Funds to so call less favoured EU regions and countries. In 
addition, EU has been using the European Innovation Scoreboard as it was called in the past and now 
Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) as the major metrics in assessing progress of all EU countries in 
terms of their innovation capacity. This metrics has become so dominant that some of its either 
individual or aggregate indicators have been used as policy objectives and benchmarks in measuring 
how countries perform in achieving the aims of SSS and other national policy targets.  
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are largely middle-income economies but it is not 
certain whether they have achieved a threshold of technological capability required for catching up 
to high-income economies status2. The shift from middle income to high-income is not guaranteed or 
is not automatic as growth process is usually non-linear and evolves across several threshold levels 
with their specific threshold requirements.  In order to understand this process we need to be open 
to a variety of historical experiences as well as go beyond simple explanations of growth be they 
adequate institutions (Daron and Robinson 2008), human capital (Glaeser et al. 2004) or Research 
and Development (R&D) (OECD  2004).  
In order to advance research in this area we approach to the issue of growth and measurement of 
growth through the perspective of technology upgrading. This is a multidimensional conceptual 
framework which is open to sensitivities of different levels of development and which is also 
empirically informed but also has some theoretical relevance. We consider it as appreciative 
theorizing framework which aim to overcome a frequent weakness of composite indicators which is 
that they represent “measurement without theory” (Koopmans 1947).  A conceptual approach is 
based on the literature review and is developed as part of this task in a paper by Radosevic and Yoruk 
(2014) Why do we need theory and metrics of technology upgrading? as part of this deliverable. Here 
we rely broadly on this approach but we also develop it further by applying it based on patent data.  
The paper is organised as follows: We first explain approach to technology upgrading by discussing its 
elements (section 2). In section 3 we use this approach to analyse individual indicators of technology 
upgrading. Section 4 explores position of EU in technology upgrading in a comparative perspective of 
the EU28 and BRICS economies. In section 5 we explore three dimensions of technology upgrading. 
Section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
1
 By European periphery we mean neighboring countries, which are not members of the EU. These are West 
Balkan countries, Turkey, and European CIS countries 
2
 Based on World Bank criteria only Bulgaria and Romania are middle income economies while others are in a 
high income group. However, from our perspective this classification is not suitable for categorising CEECs and 
for understanding middle income trap. 
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2. DETECTING TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING THROUGH PATENT DATA: A CONCEPTUAL 
APPROACH  
Our departing proposition is that technology upgrading is multidimensional process. By this we mean 
that: it is based on broader understanding of innovation, which goes well beyond R&D. It is multi-
level process which means that it is micro, mezzo and macro grounded but which also means that at 
its core is structural change in various dimensions: technological, industrial, organisational. It is also 
an outcome of global forces (embodied in international trade and investment flows) and local 
strategies (pursued by host country firms and governments)(for extensive review of literature on this 
issue see Radosevic and Yoruk 2014; for perspective along these lines see Ernst 2008;Lall 1992).  
In nutshell, based on literature review and at general level we approach to technology upgrading as 
three-dimensional process.  It consists of dimension 1: which is about intensity of technology 
upgrading as depicted by different types and levels of innovation activities, of dimension 2: which is 
about spread or width of technology like diversity of technological knowledge, and of dimension 3: 
which depicts knowledge inflows into economy through a variety of forms like trade, FDI and global 
value chains. All three dimensions have strong grounding in the respective literatures on firm level 
technology upgrading, on structural change and growth, and on integration in global economy. 
Figure 1 summarizes three dimensions and paths of technology upgrading.  
 
Figure 1. Dimensions and paths of technology upgrading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors 
 
DIMENSION1 
Intensity of technology upgrading:  
from behind technology frontier 
to technology frontier 
 
DIMENSION 3 
Interaction with global economy  
(from inventions driven by foreign actors, to co-inventions  
and to technology sourcing from abroad)   
 
DIMENSION 2 
Breadth of technology upgrading 
(structural changes towards diversification of technological 
knowledge and increased share of high technology and 
knowledge intensive activities) 
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In the technology upgrading process dimension 1 evolves from domestic behind technology frontier 
efforts towards world frontier technology efforts. Dimension 2 goes in direction of increasing 
diversification in terms of categories of technological knowledge and increasing share of knowledge 
in high growth or dynamic areas. Dimension 3 evolves from invention process being driven by foreign 
actors towards joint knowledge generation and then towards sourcing of technology from abroad. 
We aim at capturing these dimensions and their evolution using patent indicators.  
The body of research on measuring countries’ performance in growth, competitiveness and 
innovation offers a variety of composite indicators. Examples are: the Global Competitiveness Index 
(WEF 2012), the Knowledge Economy Index (Chen and Dahlman, 2004) of the World Bank, the World 
Competitiveness Report Index of IMD (http://www.imd.org/), Technological capability of countries 
and the ArCo, (Archibugi and Coco, 2005, 2004; Archibugi et al., 2009), the UNIDO Industrial 
Performance Scoreboard (UNIPS), the Summary Innovation Index and the Global Innovation Index, 
both of the European Commission; the Technological Activity Index of the UNIDO; the Technological 
Advance Index of the UNCTAD; the Technology Achievement Index, developed by UNDP and 
reported in the Human Development Report 2001, and the S&T Capacity Index (STCI) proposed by 
the RAND Corporation, the High-Tech Indicators (HTI) developed at the Georgia Tech Technology 
Policy and Assessment Center and reported by the National Science Foundation's Science & 
Engineering Indicators. 
Nasierowski and Arcelus (2000) show that similarity in ranking across different indexes are 
significant. They all point to importance of innovation to economic development but differences in 
their conceptual perspectives do not change significantly ranking among countries. Archibugi  et al. 
(2009)  show similar results but also show that differences in ranking cannot be substituted by single 
indicator like R&D.  
It is important to bear in mind that different indexes treat ‘technology’ in different ways. Some of 
them cannot be taken as a direct measure of innovative performance. Indicators like Global 
Competiveness Index depict the quality of the current endowment of a country (including 
institutions) and among them also the technology activities as one of determinants of growth. Our 
aim is to confine ourselves to technology upgrading and we do not aim to unravel a complex picture 
of the entirety of factors that determine growth and competiveness of economies.  Also, unlike the 
majority of rankings, our aim is not really to focus on ranking but on different paths of technology 
upgrading. The learning effect should be in showing diversity of paths and compare countries in 
terms of their own upgrading paths.  
The specificity of our paper is that we depict patterns of technology upgrading by relying entirely on 
patent data. On the one hand, the exclusive reliance on patents has costs in terms of capturing only a 
part of technology effort. Their intangible character is more advantageous as countries move up 
towards technology frontier and less relevant for countries behind technology frontier where IPRs 
are not the major form of protection of technological knowhow.  This is especially important as 
innovation activities in latecomer economies like CEE are largely about adoption and improvements 
on imported machinery. Although, technology as stock of knowledge should be kept separate from 
production, technological capacities and production capacity are in reality strictly interconnected 
(Bell and Pavitt 1997). However, use of only patents means that similar to  Archibugi and Coco (2005) 
we need to abstract production from technology capability. On the other hand, an important 
advantage of using patents is the length and consistency of time series derived as well as the 
possibility to identify technological fields or specializations using the patent classification. Unlike 
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macroeconomic variables technological capabilities are changing very slowly even during periods of 
deep economic crises or high growth periods (Archibugi 2009).  By using patents we can detect easily 
stock and flows and thus depict much better compared to other indicators changes in technology 
intensity as well as structural change in technological knowledge. These two dimensions – 
technology upgrading and structural change – should be considered jointly with the way economy 
integrates itself in global knowledge flows.  
In overall, we think that benefits surpass costs in this case provided that we are aware of the 
changing nature of patenting as countries move from the position of technology followers to leaders 
and as they shift from domestic and behind frontier technology effort to world frontier technology 
effort. Figure 2 shows patent indicators used which depict individual dimensions of technology 
upgrading.   
Figure 2. Dimensions and components of technology upgrading as depicted by patent 
indicators 
 
Source: authors 
 
2.1. INTENSITY OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING (SCALE) 
 
This dimension of upgrading is about acquiring different types of technology capabilities, which are 
also a reflection of different technological levels of economies. Economies that operate behind 
technology frontier are more likely to grow based on production capability while high-income 
economies are more likely to grow based on technology frontier (R&D based) activities. Three types 
of capabilities (production capability, technology capability, R&D) are present in all economies to 
different degrees. Their importance as drivers of growth varies in dependence of achieved income 
and technology levels as well as of the structural features of economies. 
We use patent indicators to measure domestic technological capability. Nonetheless, for the analysis 
it is necessary to differ between domestic technological capability pushing the technology frontier 
and domestic technological capability for technological development behind technology frontier. To 
capture domestic technological activities pushing the technology frontier we rely on transnational 
patent applications of domestic applicants (TN). Transnational patent applications include 
•Transnational patenting (TN) 
•Resident direct patenting (WIPO) 
Intensity of 
technology 
upgrading 
• Foreign applications of national inventions (FANI) 
•International Co-inventions (COINV) 
•National applications of foreign inventions NAFI) 
Interaction with 
global economy 
•Patent applications in high tech and knowledge intensive 
services (HTKI) 
• Technological knowledge diversification of domestic and 
transnational patent categories (Herfindhal index) 
Breadth of 
technology 
upgrading  
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applications to the European Patent Office and PCT applications. These patent filings reflect 
technological activities relevant for competitiveness in international markets. This international 
relevance of patent protection suggests that the technology protected pushes the technology 
frontier at a global level.  To capture technological capability for technological development behind 
the technology frontier we use direct patent applications by residents to their respective national 
patent offices. In general terms (even though the patent strategies may differ from this rule) 
residents will directly apply for patents in their home countries disregarding applications abroad if 
their technological activities do not have a global industrial relevance.3 To us resident direct patent 
applications to national patent offices dominantly proxy technology effort behind the technology 
frontier. Countries that are behind technology frontier should have much higher share of resident 
patents and their share of transnational patents is marginal. However, as they move towards 
technology frontier their transnational patenting increases. This pattern may be somewhat different 
in very large catching up economies where domestic patenting may continue to play important role. 
However, their transnational patenting as proxy of world frontier technology effort should continue 
to increase. 
Figure 3 shows on the left the relationship between transnational patents applications per capita 
(TN) and GDP per capita for the EU12 (developed or core EU), South EU (Greece, Portugal and Spain) 
and the EU CEECs over 1990-2012 period. On the right Figure 1 shows same relationship but for 
WIPO patents per capita i.e. for domestic technology effort. The relationship is much better for 
transnational patents which indicate close relationship with levels of GDPpc. 
                                                          
3 We are aware that this strategy is much more relevant for smaller than for larger and more developed 
economies where due to their economic size we may expect that more patents will be registered as priority 
patents i.e both at home and abroad than in small economies. However, this factor in analysis is controlled by 
patents by GDP proxy. 
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Figure 3. Technology intensity at the frontier and behind the frontier vs GDP pc.  
 
Source: RegPat, World Bank and authors’ calculations 
 
GDP pc vs TN Patents pc     GDP pc vs. Resident Patents pc 
EU12 (1990-2011)     EU12 (1990-2011) 
     
GDP pc vs TN Patents pc     GDP pc vs. Resident Patents pc 
SouthEU (1990-2011)     SouthEU (1990-2011) 
 
GDP pc vs TN Patents pc      GDP pc vs. Resident Patents pc 
CEE (1990-2011)      CEE (1990-2011) 
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2.2. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
There is not general theory of structural change but a variety of theoretical approaches of different 
methodological nature that aim to explain structural shifts between three broad sectors and among 
industries within these sectors (Krueger 2008). There is a common understanding that technological 
changes affect structural change in the way that industries with relatively lower rates of productivity 
growth tend to shrink in terms of shares while those with higher rates of productivity growth expand. 
In this way structural change promotes aggregate productivity growth even if we assume that within 
industries productivity growth remains stagnant. However, the empirical evidence on the role of 
structural change in aggregate productivity growth escapes broad generalisations.  It generates 
positive as well as negative contributions to aggregate productivity growth. Since many of these 
effects net out, structural change on average appears to have only a weak impact (Peneder, 2003). 
So, instead of being focused on structural changes at the level of industries it seems more 
appropriate to track changes in the structure of technological knowledge. 
We depict structural change in technological knowledge by using two indicators. First, transnational 
patent applications in high technology fields and knowledge-intensive services. Second, we use 
technological diversification index based on Herfindhal index of transnational patents across 35 
technological fields. This index is based on Lee (2013) who shows that catching up from middle 
income to high income status is accompanied by diversification of technological knowledge.  
We should expect that latecomer economies have initially highly concentrated structure of patents 
which are diversifying as they are upgrading technologically i.e the number of patents categories 
with patents is increasing. This process should be present in the case of both resident and 
transnational patents. However, we would expect that dispersion of technology effort should be 
more pronounced in the case of transnational than resident patents.  Also, we may expect that as 
countries are catching up that they are increasingly involved in high growth patenting areas which 
are in high tech categories and in knowledge intensive services areas. 
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2.3. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND INTERACTION WITH GLOBAL ECONOMY 
A successful technology upgrading is never entirely autonomous process but is always linked to 
inflow of foreign knowledge skills, which are coupled with intensive domestic technology effort 
(Radosevic 1999). The key to catch-up and post-catch-up is leverage of domestic innovation efforts 
with global industrial or knowledge networks (Dieter 2008). Hence, magnitude of knowledge inflows 
and their coupling to domestic innovations efforts are important dimensions of technology 
upgrading.  A globalisation of technology exploitation and collaboration but also technology 
generation through globalization of R&D process has further increased the importance of 
international linkages for industrial upgrading (UNCTAD, 2005). Drawing on the Cross-border 
Ownership approach by Guellec and van Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) we use patent indicators to 
gauge technology sourcing from foreigners as well as interaction or cooperation in technological 
activity with foreign actors. Guellec and van Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) developed the concept of 
the Cross-border Ownership to explore globalization of RD process. We use the indicators from the 
perspective of technology upgrading which leads to slightly different interpretations.  Technology 
sourcing from a global perspective and the nature of interaction with foreign actors change from the 
catch up to the post catch up stage, which is reflected in patent indicators. We use three indicators 
to explore these processes. 
 
Foreign Applications of Native Inventions (FANI) measure the extent to which technological 
development in a country or region is driven by foreign actors. This is primarily important in the 
catch-up phase of host countries. If we assume that inventors have the technological capabilities and 
applicants exploit these capabilities commercially, this indicator is a proxy for the involvement of 
foreign actors in the exploitation of native technological capabilities.  
International Co-invention in technological activities (COINV) measure international collaboration 
using patent applications with inventors residing in different countries. The share of patents involving 
inventors from different countries shows the degree to which knowledge generation is 
internationalized.   
Native Applications of Foreign Inventions (NAFI) is a proxy for the exploitation of technological 
capabilities abroad as it measures the extent to which technological development in a country is 
making use of knowledge or technology sourcing from abroad. Arguably, this element becomes 
increasingly important in the later stages of the catch-up phase of host countries and might 
characterize high-income host countries. In that respect, it may be expected that countries behind 
technology frontier have high share of FANI, are increasingly involved in COINV and have smaller 
share of NAFI. As they are technology upgrading it may be expected that share of FANI declines, 
while shares of COINV and NAFI are increasing. 
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3. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING THROUGH PATENT DATA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Based on this conceptual framework in this section we analyze patterns of technology upgrading of 
the CEECs but in a comparative context of the EU28 and BRICS economies. We consider CEE 
countries individually as well as groups of EU countries to analyze the convergence process in Europe 
between 1990 and 2011. The groups of countries considered are EU12, EU South and CEE. Indicators 
for these group of countries are built using the average across countries within the respective group 
(CEE, EU12, South EU). Moreover, CEE are compared to BRICS. We follow dimensions of technology 
upgrading as explained in section 2.  
3.1. Intensity of technology upgrading 
As mentioned above, intensity of technology upgrading is reflected on the technology capability of 
the country. To capture domestic technological capability pushing the technology frontier we rely on 
transnational patent applications of domestic applicants compiled from the OECD RegPat Dabase 
(Version January 2014). To capture technological capability for technological development behind 
the technology frontier we use direct patent applications by residents to their respective national 
patent offices. The World International Patent Office (WIPO) provides with data on direct 
applications by resident applicants to their national offices. 
3.1.1. Technological capability pushing the technology frontier 
Drawing on Frietsch and Jung (2009) the counts of transnational patents (TN) include all PCT 
applications whether transferred to the EPO or not and all direct EPO applications without precursor 
PCT application.4  We consider two indicators: Transnational patent applications per GDP (TNpGDP) 
and Transnational Patent Applications per capita (TNpc). TNpGDP captures the technology intensity 
of the economy at the technological frontier.  TNpc capture the technology intensity of the country. 
Figure 4 includes the indicators for different CEE countries and group of countries. 
                                                          
4
 The origin of the invention is defined by the country of residence of the applicants. The indicators use the 
applicant country for the geographic designation of the invention in order to be consistent with the data 
available from WIPO. The application year (rather than the priority year) is considered for the same reason. If 
an invention involves applicants from different countries each country will be assigned with one application 
(and not a fraction of it). 
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Figure 4. Indicators to capture technological capability pushing the technology frontier 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, World Bank and authors’ calculations.  
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In what concerns the European Union, per GDP and per capita indicators of technological intensity 
display strong growth from early 1990s and deceleration of this process after 2008. Within EU the 
data suggest a divergence on core and periphery countries. This is especially present in terms of 
growth of patents until 2008 when patenting in the developed EU12 slows down.    
The comparison of CEE with BRICS suggests that in pc terms CEE has higher ‘technology intensity of 
country’ (not economy) than China. China’s catch up started in 2000s not in 1990s as CEE. So, this is 
quite recent phenomenon which is telling about technology upgrading of China. A strong catch up 
CEE in per capita terms is lost in GDP terms while Chinese is not. In other words, CEEC as countries 
have become more patent (technology) intensive but not as economies. The increasing/decreasing 
gap between TN patenting in pc and GDP terms is an indicative proxy for increasing or decreasing 
alignment or misalignment of their National Innovation Systems (Tunzelmann et al. 2012). 
In the group of CEE countries Slovenia is the clear leader in terms of transnational patents per capita. 
This can be reflection of its very high relative GERD, its high income but also its profile of R&D system 
which may be geared more towards patentable sectors especially pharma and chemicals (OECD 
2012, p. 108). Estonia is second leader largely. Slovenia is outlier in per capita terms but joined with 
Estonia in GDP terms. Both countries are still above China but given differences in size this is 
remarkable for China and puts all CEE successes in perspective. Among CEECs, it is interesting to see 
that continuous growth of Poland is reflected in transnational patents per GDP. Given still very small 
numbers we consider this to be the reflection rather than driver of growth.  
3.1.2. Technological capability behind the technology frontier 
Analog to the use of transnational patents we build per GDP and per capita indicators for the period 
1990-2012. Figure 5 presents the patent indicators per application year. 
In overall, there seems to be much less increase in technology intensity of country in terms of direct 
applications to national offices (behind the frontier effort) than in terms of TN patents (at world 
frontier). This is expected given decrease in demand for domestic behind frontier effort when 
compared to imported technology. A stagnant trend in EU28 and in its subregions shows the 
declining importance of technology efforts oriented towards local/national markets (see figures 1 
and 2 above). This may be expected given continuous economic and institutional changes towards 
European research area and effects of industrial networks in the EU, especially between Germany, 
Austria and Central Europe. Some increase in CE and South EU after 2008 is difficult to interpret 
except as the effect of Structural Funds (at least in CEE and increase in GERD/GDP ratios).  
A higher number of direct resident applications per GDP in CEE when compared to the EU12 shows 
that in terms of behind the frontier technology effort CEE were high in early 1990s, especially given 
significant decreases in their GDP. On the other hand, a decline of resident patents per GDP in CEE 
shows increasing internationalization of their economies where behind the technology frontier effort 
is being increasingly squeezed by opening of their innovation systems. Hence, we observe a strong 
convergence. However, it seems that the level has now stabilized and even slightly increased as the 
effect of 2008. This is also the case in the EU South. 
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Figure 5. Indicators to capture technological capability behind the technology frontier 
Source: OCED RegPat, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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In what concerns the comparison between CEE with BRICS, China shows a strong increase of both 
behind and on the frontier technology effort. So, in the case of China we do not observe hyper 
integration features of India or closed economy of Russia but there are elements of coupling 
between domestic and technology frontier. Russia is unique in its persistent and high levels of behind 
the frontier technology effort. This is quite expected given the nature of its system of innovation 
Within CEE Slovenia is again leader in terms of ‘technology intensity of country’ (not economy): A 
strong increase after 2008 in Slovenia is probably due to effects of Structural Funds in support of 
domestic RTD system, especially centres of excellence and competence centres. 
3.2. Breadth of technology upgrading 
To analyze breadth of technology upgrading we focus on features of structural change. This is about 
widening ‘surface’ of technology efforts or increasing number of technology areas in which countries 
get involved or patent as they progress in technology upgrading. We define two structural change 
indicators to measure this process: (i) the relevance of high technology and knowledge intensive 
services patents in the technological activities and (ii) the diversification of the technological 
activities across 35 technological fields.  
3.2.1. High Tech Knowledge Intensive Patents 
Using transnational patent applications we consider the share of patents in the high technology fields 
and knowledge intensive services (HKTI). To define high technology we use the EUROSTAT 
definition.5 The indicator used is the share of HTKI patent applications to the total patent output in 
the country per application year. We frame HTKI patents as patents that reflect high growth 
technology areas or ‘dynamic technology frontier patenting activities’. 
Figure 6. Share of HTKI Patents in total patent output per application year (3 Years MA) 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 6 shows the indicator for different countries and groups of countries. The share of HTKI 
patents at technology frontier is on average  6% in CEE, 11.4% in EU15 and 6.1% in South EU. In the 
EU periphery technology activities in currently growing and dynamic areas related to ICT presumably 
are underrepresented. This seems to correspond to an analysis on based priority patents (Dominguez 
Lacasa and Giebler 2014). However, there is a positive structural change of shifting towards HTKI 
                                                          
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an6.pdf (last accessed 13.01.2015) 
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areas which is strikingly similar in both EU South and CEE.  A decline in share of HTKI areas at the 
EU15 level shows that technology path of EU is quite different from US or East Asia. 
BRICs shows a gradual but upward increase in the share of HTKI patents with China having the 
highest share but also decline in the share after 2007/08. This maybe reflects a changing orientation 
of Chinese growth towards more domestic technology based growth (after 2008) and technology 
diversification in transition from middle to high income as argued by Lee (2013). The indicator for 
China nicely shows that its boom does not have anything to do with dot.com wave in 2001. The same 
holds for the other BRIC countries. This suggests that the nature of globalization is largely about 
absorptive capacities of catching up countries not catching up at frontier (Radosevic and Yoruk, 2014, 
OECD 2010). It is quite surprising to observe a low share of HTKI of India given possible hypothesis on 
‘hyperintegrationist’ mode of development as opposed to China. Interestingly, they are on two 
different sides within the BRICS spectrum. Within the BRICS the biggest surprise is India which shows 
that its technological strengths in services are not yet in services that can be captured by patent 
indicators. Its export of software is not of patentable type. 
In general terms CEE falls clearly within BRIC spectrum even in terms of secular increase in share of 
HTKI areas.  
3.2.2 Technology diversification 
Drawing on Lee’s (2013) idea that catching up process translate into an increasing diversification of 
technological activities we aim at analysing trends in diversification of technological capabilities. To 
measure technological diversification we use the Herfindhal index of transnational patent 
applications and resident direct patent applications to the national offices across 35 technological 
fields (Schmoch 2008). The assignment of an invention to a technological sector or specific 
technology field follows a fractional counting methodology.6 The Herfindhal index is normalized 
between 0 and 1. Values close to 1 mean concentration. Values close to 0 mean diversification. 
Figure 7.  HH-Index: Transnational Patents (3 Years MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
  
                                                          
6
 If a transnational patent application includes patent classes that belong to different technological areas or 
technologies a fraction (and not a whole count) will be considered for each technological area or technology. 
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Figure 8. HH-Index: resident direct patent applications to the national offices (3 Years MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
The indicators presented in Figures 7 and Figure 8 suggest a clear trend towards diversification which 
is in line with Lee’s (2013) hypothesis and results except for China for TN patents and for India for 
domestic patents. .  
For TN patenting, trends in the EU periphery shows strong diversification though at a somewhat 
higher levels of concentration in CEECs than in the EU South. A diversification trends is feature of all 
CEECs despite their quite different starting levels of concentration/diversification. There is strong 
convergence of both the EU South and CEE to the core which presumably should mean that the 
overall technological knowledge structure in the EU is becoming strongly determined by the EU core. 
However, this trend has slowed down significantly after 2001 despite economic growth which was 
high until 2008.  
Trends towards diversification of technological knowledge are also feature of the BRICs except China 
after 2000. First, we observe very strong diversification of India and CEE which suggest technology 
upgrading via diversification. Second, there is a very slow diversification trend in Russia, Brazil and 
South Africa which may reflect slow structural change in their technology systems. Third, China 
shows opposite trend – towards concentration or decrease in number of transnational patent 
categories. How do we interpret this seemingly counterintuitive trend? Has China already moved 
towards technology structure of the upper income economies? Lee (2013) shows that diversification 
is trend in transition from middle to upper income stage after which countries continue to specialize. 
China does not seem to conform to this trend.  
As we would expect diversification is much less pronounced in resident patenting which largely 
reflect domestic and behind the frontier technology effort. The slow tendency towards diversification 
is present in all countries with exception of India after 1997, South EU after 2001 and China after 
2004. Without in depth analyses of each regions technology systems it is quite difficult to interpret 
structural changes in generation of technological knowledge behind technology frontier. Also, we see 
need for further research in exploring diverging vs. converging trends between structural change of 
TN and resident patenting. 
3.3. Interaction with the Global Economy 
In general, the key idea here is to use patent based indicators to gauge technology and knowledge 
flows as well as interaction or cooperation in technological activity with foreign actors. The flows and 
the modes of interaction with foreign actors change along the catch up process, which should be 
reflected in the indicators. We use three indicators originally developed by Guellec and van 
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Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) to track technology sourcing from a global perspective and international 
knowledge cooperation. 
3.3.1. Foreign applications of National inventions (FANI)  
FANI shows the share of TN patents that are invented by inventors in country x but applicants are 
from country y. Guellec and van Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) interpreted the indicators as the extent 
to which technological development in a country or region is driven by foreign actors. A large FANI 
Rate suggests the strong importance of foreign actors exploiting the technological activities of a 
country or region. A low FANI Rate suggests that native inventions are mainly applied by native 
actors.  If we assume that inventors have the technological capabilities and applicants have 
commercial and organizational capabilities this indicator can tell us something about the relationship 
between technical and non-technical capabilities. According to Teece (1986) for successful 
innovation and technological development at the firm level it is not enough to have technology 
capabilities but also complementary assets to put these capabilities into use. At firm levels this 
means organisational capabilities in addition to only invention capacity. His answer to who actually 
profits from innovation, pointed to owners of complementary assets, particularly when they are 
specialized and/or co-specialized. So, following Teece (1986) we interpret large FANI as a proxy for 
organisational capabilities of firms or individuals to commercialize inventions on their own. For firms 
that are applicants of foreign inventions this indicates presence of organisational capabilities to 
commercialize inventions as well as understanding of available technological inventions abroad 
which are patentable. 
From the perspective of complementary or organizational capabilities, a declining FANI rate all else 
equal is a sign of upgrading in complementary or organisational capabilities in the country or capacity 
to profit from their technological activities. Figure 9 presents the indicator for different countries and 
group of countries. 
Figure 9. Rate of Foreign Applications of Native Inventions (FANI Rate) (3 year MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
From the complementary or organisational capabilities view, the sudden increase in FANI Rate in 
1990-1993 in CEE is a reflection of weak organisational capabilities of firms in newly opened 
economies to handle invention process on their own and also of better understanding of foreigners 
what are available technological inventions which are patentable. However, situation has stabilised 
and if we take mid-1990s as the beginning of normal period we do not observe improvements in 
organisational or complementary capabilities. In fact, average between 1995-1998 and 2010-2012 
shows a minor decline in all CEECs. We observe similar weakening of complementary capabilities in 
South EU as well as in the EU12. This trend can be a reflection of weakening of these capabilities 
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across Europe (i.e. of declining role of EU large firms as organisers of innovation processes) but this 
can also be a reflection of globalisation of innovation process.  
Given our interpretation of FANI we would expect that successful technology upgrading would be 
reflected in decreasing FANI. Data for BRICs and CEE are in line with this hypothesis. For example, 
China’s FANI rates have declined dramatically reflecting organisational power of Chinese MNEs. 
Indian complementary capabilities as reflected in FANI have improved until 2001/2002 (dot.com 
period) and have declined afterwards as reflected in increased FANI indices. Russian and especially 
Brazilian FANI Indices are gradually and slowly decreasing reflecting gradually improving 
complementary capabilities of their firms, especially MNEs. Within BRIC context CEE FANI rates 
seems quite stagnant reflecting possibly very weak endogenous organisational capabilities i.e a low 
share of domestic large firms in technology activities.  
3.3.2. Indicators for Knowledge Cooperation: Coinventions (COINV) 
As countries upgrade technologically their capability for joint international generation of inventions 
should increase. An increase in joint patents also reflects changing nature of invention process which 
is becoming more globalized as depicted also by FANI and NAFI indicators.  Guellec and van 
Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) measure international collaboration using patent applications with 
inventors residing in different countries: the share of patents resulting from international research 
co-operation (inventors from different countries) in the total number of patents invented by 
residents of a given country. Here we use identical measure.  
Figure 10.  Share of International Co-Inventions (COINV Rate) (3 year MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
As given in Figure 10, the indicator shows significant globalization of knowledge generation in the EU 
and in its three sub-regions.  By 2012 in all three sub-regions of the EU around 40% of all TN patents 
applications involve at least one foreign and one domestic inventor (COINV). However, there are 
significant differences in trends between three sub regions.  At EU periphery there seems to be 
stagnation in COINV rates after 2001 (South EU) but especially after 2008 (South and CEE). This may 
possibly reflect the effect of worsening of macroeconomic conditions after 2008 on R&D based 
investment and thus on technology knowledge co-generation.  
Levels of technology co-generation are lower in BRICS than in the CEE and the rest of the EU. Among 
BRICS China is distinctive as its share of co-inventions declines continually reflecting much stronger 
patenting by Chinese companies themselves. Hence, this relative decline should not be confused 
with absolute very strong growth of Chinese TN patents. Russia and Brazil again have similar trend of 
stagnant COINV rate but given size of these economies the share of co-inventing is actually quite 
high. India’s patenting was during the 1990s more than half based on co-inventions but COINV was 
also rapidly declining reflecting increasing indigenous technological capabilities. After 2001 India has 
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been increasingly involved in technology cooperation at very high level for such large economy. 
Again, compared to China it is on the other side of the BRIC spectrum. Its share of technology co-
inventions is similar now to the CEE which is a much smaller region. 
3.3.3. National Application of foreign Inventions (NAFI) 
Drawing again on Guellec and van Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) we compute the share of transnational 
patent applications with applicants located in a country that involve at least one inventor located 
abroad. This indicator is a proxy for the exploitation of technological capabilities abroad (Native 
Applications of Foreign Inventions - NAFI). These patent-based indicators aim at measuring the 
extent to which technological development in a country is making use of knowledge or technology 
sourcing from abroad. Arguably, this element become increasingly important in the later stages of 
the catch-up phase of host countries and might characterize high-income host countries. The 
operationalization follows the logic outline for FANI above. Counting transnational applications per 
application year, the number of transnational patents applied by natives and invented by foreigners 
and (NAFI) is divided by the total number of transnational patents with at least one national 
applicant (NAFI-Rate). From the perspective of technology upgrading, we interpret the capacity of 
countries to source technology from abroad as measured by NAFI as the sign of high or increase 
organizational capabilities all else equal. A high or increased NAFI would indicate improvement in 
these capabilities and vice versa. 
Figure 11.  Rate of Native Applications of Foreign Inventions (FANI Rate) (3 year MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 11 includes NAFI rates for different countries and groups of countries. NAFI indices for EU 
regions shows that technology sourcing abroad has initially declined in CEE and has remained 
stagnant and at comparatively very low level since mid-1990s while it has increased significantly at 
EU12 and South EU. Surprisingly levels of NAFI for EU12 and South EU are relatively similar which 
should reflect similar capacities for technology sourcing abroad. Among CEECs, there were initial 
differences in NAFI but these have been gradually converging as times goes by. NAFI, which in our 
context denote capacities for technology sourcing abroad, have been stagnant in BRICs which may 
seems surprising given the newly emerging literature and evidence on emerging markets MNEs, 
some of which have relied on technology sourcing as one of their strategies orientations. In 
particular, declining NAFI of China seems to suggest that despite individual high profile cases of BRICS 
MNEs sourcing technology abroad these cases do not yet represent trend or technology sourcing is 
not their key strategic orientation. However, we should bear in mind that NAFI or share of 
transnational patent applications with applicants located in a country that involve at least one 
inventor located abroad is quotient and we should bear in mind that it is dependent on total number 
of TN patents. A catching up country that has high and growing number of TN patents but still low 
number of its patents invented abroad is actually doing still better than country that has high NAFI 
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but low number of its TN patents. This is exactly the case between the CEE and China where former 
has higher NAFI but much lower number of TN patents.  
4. TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING IN EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
In this section we merge three dimensions and all indicators into one graphic form – network 
diagram -   to explore levels and patterns of changes of technology upgrading. Each graphic includes 
7 indicators. The technological intensity of a country is represented by the number of patent 
applications by residents at the national filing office per GDP (domestic technological intensity) and 
the by the number of transnational patent applications by national applicants per GDP (frontier 
technological intensity).  The breadth of technological upgrading is represented by share of high tech 
knowledge intensive transnational patent applications in total transnational patent applications (High 
tech patents) and the degree of concentration of patent applications by residents at the national 
filing of the country across 35 technological areas (specialisation). The technological interaction with 
the global economy is represented by three indicators: The share of applications with at least one 
national applicant and at least one foreign inventor in total transnational inventions filed by at least 
one national applicant (NAFI Rate); the share of foreign applications with at least one foreign 
applicant and at least one national inventor in total transnational applications with at least one 
national inventor (FANI Rate); and the share of transnational patent applications involving at least 
one foreign as well as one domestic inventor in the total number of transnational patent applications 
invented by at least one native (COINV Rate). 
First, we analyze each of the CEE countries in comparison to other EU countries at a particular point 
in time (2011). In a second section we explore the position of the CEE in relation to BRICS using 
identical approach. 
4.1. Technological upgrading in the EU 
We consider the seven indicators for CEE countries for the year 2011. In addition, we indicate the 
relative change in percent for each indicator for the respective CEE country in comparison to the year 
1995 (or the latest available). In the diagrams we compare each of the eleven CEE countries to the 
other ten CEE countries, South European countries as well as EU12 countries. The values for each 
indicator used for graphical representation are scaled between 0 and 1 using all country values for 26 
EU countries. Then we generated simple unweighted average for the other ten CEE countries, the 
group of South European economies as well as the group of the EU12 countries. Thus, the graphical 
space represented by the seven dimensions in each of the diagrams corresponds to the possible 
maximum values by 26 EU countries at the point of observation (2011). 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 bellow show the profile of technology upgrading of the individual CEECs in 
relation to the EU12, South EU and other CEECs. We do not go into detailed description of profiles of 
each of 11 CEECs but draw only two general conclusions. First, technology upgrading profiles of the 
CEECs are pretty homogenous which reflects their technological levels and relative distance to the 
EU-12. A typical CEE economy is well behind EU12 in terms of frontier technology intensity, domestic 
technological intensity, share of high tech patents and technology sourcing abroad (NAFI). Its 
organizational capabilities are often less advanced as reflected in high share of FANI.  The CEE profile 
is much less coherent in terms of technology diversification/specialization and share of joint 
inventions. Second, differences among CEECs are not significant in the sense that we can talk of 
distinct national technology profiles. Poland, Romania and Slovenia have above average domestic 
technological intensity which reflects partly their sizes (Romania and Poland) and specific model of 
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innovation system reliant on domestic R&D intensive firms (Slovenia). Latvia and Lithuania are 
specific in terms of high share of HTKI patents. 
 
Figure 12. 2011 Indicators for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary and 
Lithuania. Comparison with EU 12, South EU and other CEE 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 13. 2011 Indicators for Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Comparison 
with EU 12, South EU and other CEE 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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4.2. Technological upgrading of Emerging Economies 
Again, using network diagrams we aim at a graphical presentation of changes in the selected 
indicators for each of the three dimensions of technological upgrading for the CEE region in 
comparison to the BRICS countries between 1995 and 2011.   
First we create two summary network diagrams that integrate all countries under observation in 
1995 and 2011 to show the change in structural indicators in these selected emerging economies and 
the CEE region (Figure 14).  Next, we offer a diagram for the CEE region and each of the BRICS 
countries (Figure 15) based on seven indicators in 1995 and 2011. The values for BRICS are country 
specific. For the CEE region we create a simple unweighted average for across the eleven CEE 
countries. Before drawing the graphs, we scale all indicators for the BRICS countries and the CEE 
region between 0 and 1. Thus, the graphical space represented by the seven dimensions in each of 
the diagrams corresponds to the possible maximum values by the BRICS countries and the CEE region 
in 1995 and 2011.  
Figure 14. Indicators for BRICS and CEE (average) in 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
A comparison of the CEECs and BRICS profiles in 1995 and 2011 offers few very interesting insights. 
First, 1995 profiles are more diverse than 2011 reflecting divergences and convergences among 
these catching-up economies. In 1995, Russia had distinctive prolife characterised by comparatively 
the highest both domestic and frontier technological intensity and together with China the highest 
share of high tech patents. CEE had the least diversified technological knowledge portfolio with 
comparatively high frontier technological intensity. China had the highest FANI rate which by 2011 
became the lowest next to Brazil reflecting increase organisational capabilities of their MNEs to 
commercialize their own inventions. India had very low ranking on all dimensions of technological 
upgrading except in terms of NAFI or sourcing technology abroad. This quite diverse set of profiles 
changed significantly by 2011. China has delinked from BRICS by highly increased domestic and 
frontier technological intensity as well as by very high share of high-tech patents.  CEE has lost its 
initial high ranking in terms of frontier technological intensity, has significantly diversified its 
technological knowledge, increased co invention rate but also became the region with the highest 
FANI rate which reflects weak organisational capabilities to commercialize its own inventions. India 
has continued to be comparatively the strongest in sourcing technology abroad but it also reduced 
diversification of its technology portfolio of inventions. Other BRICS – Russia, Brazil and South Africa 
– have features which fall within these three specific cases of China, CEE and India. Russia has lost its 
advantages in terms of the highest frontier and domestic technological intensity. In overall, we have 
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seen a shift from much more diverse technology upgrading profiles in 1995 towards four profiles: 
China, CEE, India and rest of BRICS (Russia, Brazil and South Africa). 
Next, we explore in greater detail changes in between 1995 and 2011 by each of BRICs and CEE 
(Figure 15). CEE technology upgrading profile has substantially changed in between 1995 and 2011. 
Its technology intensity, both at frontier and domestic, has been declined and its openness has 
significantly changed as shown by increased co-invention, NAFI and FANI rates. On positive side, its 
technology profile has diversified as should be expected when countries are transiting from middle 
towards high income status. Also, its capacity for sourcing technology abroad has also somewhat 
improved. However, invention process in CEE has become much less intensive but it is now taking 
place in cooperation with foreign partners (COINV) who have organisational capabilities to 
commercialize local inventions (NAFI). The CEE case contains interesting lessons regarding costs and 
benefits in terms of openness and autonomy of technology systems. 
Changes in profile of Russian technology upgrading have been similar but also much more dramatic 
when compared to the CEE. First, its decline of frontier and domestic technological intensity has 
been much sharper than in the CEE. Also its share of high tech patents has significantly declined. This 
loss of technology intensity of CEE has been compensated by stringer interaction with global 
economy through high coinvention rate which was not the case in Russia. Also, its FANI and NAFI 
rates have remained relatively unchanged. As in CEE, there has been positive tendency of increased 
technological diversification.  
China’s profile of technology upgrading shows very strong increase in both domestic as well as in 
frontier technological intensity at the same share of high tech patents. On the other hand, 
technological upgrading was not followed by its increased technological openness. Its coinvention 
rate has dropped significantly and its capacity for sourcing technology abroad has declined 
somewhat. FANI rate for China has declined dramatically which actually shows increased capability of 
its MNEs to commercialize their own inventions. Given huge increases in China’s technological 
intensity this dimension of interaction with global economy should be seen in relative terms as 
relatively less intensive given much higher increase in technological intensity.  In this respect, a 
Chinese model of technology upgrading is quite different from the CEE which had to compensate its 
decreasing technological intensity by more technological openness.  
India has very low technological intensity which despite its high economic growth in this period has 
further shrank questioning whether its further growth can rely on technology or on other production 
factors. Similar to CEE India has to compensate much less dramatic loss of technology intensity by 
increase knowledge cogeneration (COINV). Its capacity to source technology from abroad has 
remained constant but its technology portfolio has further concentrated which is not the best basis 
for technology upgrading of such a large economy. 
Changes in Brazilian technology upgrading profile have been much less intensive when compared to 
China, Russia, and CEE. Relatively small decreases in technology intensity and in share of high tech 
patents have also resulted like in CEE and India to increases in knowledge cogeneration at relatively 
similar NAFI and FANI rates. South Africa followed similar pattern as its domestic and especially 
frontier technology intensity have declined as well as share of high tech patents. As in Brazil, CEE and 
India this has led to increases in co-invention rates and with slight changes in NAFI and FANI rates at 
unchanged degree of technology diversification. 
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Figure 15. Indicators for BRICS and CEE (average) in 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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5. EXPLORING DIMENSIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING  
So far, we focused on identifying differences and changes to the technological profile of CEE 
countries in comparison to other European economies and the BRICS countries by using selected 
patent based indicators. In the final part of the analysis, we aim to explore all three dimension of 
technological upgrading: technology intensity, structural changes and knowledge interaction with 
global economy. We have departed from the proposition that technology upgrading is 
multidimensional process and these three dimensions are different facets of this complex process. 
Statistically, it is possible to create a simple composite indicator of technological upgrading based on 
selected indicators across countries within the observation period. In order to this, we need to make 
some assumptions about the relation between our indicators and technological upgrading. This 
seems straight forward in case of technological capability or intensity. Here we assume that a higher 
value for technological intensity with regard to domestic or frontier technology corresponds to a 
higher stage in technological development of the country. Second we assume that the breadth of 
technological upgrading is higher, if the share of high tech knowledge intensive patents in 
transnational patent applications is higher as well as the degree of diversification of domestic 
technological activity across technological areas is higher. Finally, we assume that higher NAFI rates 
(i.e. transnational patent applications with national applicants and foreign inventors) correspond to 
stages of higher technological development as capacity of countries to source technology globally 
increases. In turn, we assume that lower FANI rates (i.e. transnational patent applications with 
foreign applicants and national inventors in total transnational inventions) corresponds to stages of 
higher technological development as countries organisation capabilities to commercialize inventions 
generated in their own country increases. Finally, we assume that COINV Rates (i.e. transnational 
patent applications involving at least one foreign as well as one domestic inventor in the total 
number of transnational patent applications with national applicants) should decline as countries 
develop technology capability to invent but also to commercialize their own inventions. 
However, we think that constructing a composite indicator of technology upgrading would defy our 
main analytical aim in this paper which is to understand the interactions between different 
dimensions of technology upgrading and their changes. ‘Burying’ different dimensions and their 
interactions into one composite indicator is in contradiction to our departing proposition to build 
metrics which takes into account different drivers of technology upgrading. Synthesizing three 
relatively independent but related processes – technology intensification, structural changes and 
knowledge exchange - into one indicator leads to decontextualized metrics. Given generally poor 
understanding of the processes of technology upgrading each of the above stated assumptions can 
more or less stand scrutiny but only as a stylized fact on its own. However, we are much less certain 
about their mutual interaction and whether the overall construct or composite indicator of 
technology upgrading is really theoretically and statistically grounded.   
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In view of these limitations as well as of the greater learning potential in exploring different 
dimensions of technology upgrading, we present summary sub-indexes for each of three dimensions 
of technology upgrading. Our analysis uses information for 1995 and 2011.The results are presented 
in Table 1.  Following the above outlined assumptions we inverse the original values for the 
indicators Herfindhal, FANI Rate and COINV Rates for each country. Using values for the year 1995 
(or the earliest year available) we rank each of the seven indicators separately, where the highest 
value corresponds to the highest rank. Then we add the ranks across the relevant indicators for each 
dimension for each country. The ranking of technological intensity is based on measures for domestic 
and frontier patenting intensity. The measure of diversification of domestic inventions and the 
relative importance of inventions in high tech and knowledge intensive activities are grouped into 
the indicator for structural changes. Finally FANI, NAFI and COINV rates are group into the ranking of 
interaction with the global economy. We give each indicator equal weigh into one composite 
indicator for each dimension. The country with the lowest sum has the highest overall rank per 
dimension. The procedure is repeated for the 2011 values. Finally we can identify relative changes in 
the ranking for each of the country between 1995 and 2011 in each dimension of technology 
upgrading. It is important to realize that this is not composite indicator of the overall technology 
upgrading but of upgrading as reflected in patent data. In that respect, this indicator shares all 
virtues and drawbacks of patents as indicators. 
We need to acknowledge that the five indicators used to measure breadth and global interaction of 
technological upgrading are measures independent from the underlying ‘size’ or intensity of 
patenting activity. For example, similarly low FANI rates (i.e. high rankings) are obtained in case of 
Malta and Finland in 2011. However, Finland has the second highest technological intensity and 
Malta is ranked 22. The FANI rate is calculated with a base of 39 transnational patent applications in 
case of Malta and with 2.324 in case of Finland. The distortion is amplified in case of the NAFI rates. 
As a result Malta comes in first on the ranking for global interaction. Similar cases apply basically to 
all CEE countries in the year 1995 and to the majority of smaller CEE countries (Baltic economies) still 
in 2011. Given the upward bias in the rankings of structural change and global interaction for 
countries with low or very low frontier or domestic technological intensity, we need to interpret the 
ranking dynamics of the corresponding countries with appropriate caution. 
Having these limitations in mind the ranking dynamics suggest the following: 
1. Technological intensity:  China has increased by far the most its patenting intensity due to 
remarkable increase of both TN and resident patents. Still, Germany and Finland are two of the most 
technology (patent) intensive economies. Given their income levels China and Slovenia are 
surprisingly highly located. This indicates their high potential for technology upgrading but also it 
shows that their current growth is not yet based on R&D. Russia’s relatively high position is largely 
due to domestic technology effort. CEE (with exception of Slovenia) are firmly in the second half of 
table together with South EU which is expected given that drivers of their growth are not related to 
technology but to production capability.  
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Table 1. Dimension of technology upgrading: patent-based rankings 1995-2011 
 Technological intensity Structural Change Global Interaction 
Country 1995 2011 Change 1995 2011 Change 1995 2011 Change 
Germany 2 1 1 6 26 -20 13 11 2 
Finland 1 2 -1 5 2 3 10 2 8 
China 18 3 15 15 1 14 19 23 -4 
Slovenia 7 4 3 16 30 -14 5 16 -11 
France 8 5 3 3 5 -2 14 9 5 
Denmark 12 6 6 12 15 -3 12 8 4 
Austria 10 7 3 21 20 1 11 13 -2 
Sweden 3 8 -5 2 6 -4 6 3 3 
Latvia 14 9 5 30 31 -1 28 22 6 
Netherlands 13 10 3 9 14 -5 3 5 -2 
Russia 4 11 -7 7 29 -22 25 30 -5 
Romania 16 12 4 31 32 -1 31 25 6 
United Kingdom 6 13 -7 1 4 -3 18 18 0 
Luxembourg 19 14 5 29 23 6 23 6 17 
Hungary 9 15 -6 24 22 2 26 32 -6 
Italy 15 16 -1 8 25 -17 4 26 -22 
Estonia 33 17 11 32 8 24 30 12 18 
Poland 20 18 2 19 13 6 27 29 -2 
India 30 19 11 27 24 3 17 33 -16 
Czech Republic 22 20 2 13 18 -5 9 27 -18 
Bulgaria 5 21 -16 11 11 0 24 21 3 
Malta 28 22 6 33 33 0 1 1 0 
Belgium 21 23 -2 4 9 -5 16 14 2 
Ireland 11 24 -13 14 10 4 15 4 11 
Croatia 17 25 -8 18 21 -3 21 28 -7 
Spain 25 26 -1 10 3 7 8 19 -11 
Lithuania 26 27 -1 23 27 -4 33 10 23 
Cyprus 27 28 -1 25 17 8 7 7 0 
Brazil 29 29 0 22 12 10 22 31 -9 
South Africa 23 30 -7 20 19 1 32 24 8 
Greece 31 31 0 26 16 10 29 20 9 
Portugal 32 32 0 28 7 21 2 17 -15 
Slovakia 24 33 -9 17 28 -11 20 15 5 
Sources: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. Authors calculation. 
The underlying indicators for technological intensity are strongly shaped by industry structure and 
favor those economies where ‘patenting industries’ like chemicals and pharma are important. This 
partly explains the relatively high position of Slovenia.  As technology intensity measure does not 
differentiate between frontier and behind the frontier patenting some economies will be higher than 
expected (Russia, Romania) or lower than expected (United Kingdom, Ireland). Based on patenting 
intensity BRICs are not homogenous entity but widely differing group with thus very different 
opportunities for growth based on technology. 
Beside China the biggest improver in terms of technology intensity (in relative ranking) are Estonia 
and India. Bulgaria and Ireland have fallen substantially behind similar to fall behind of Russia, 
Romania, Croatia and South Africa. 
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2. Structural changes as depicted through indicators of patent diversification and shift towards high 
tech patenting is favoring countries behind the frontier as they have much more scope for 
convergence or reaching structure of the frontier economies. China and Estonia are again the biggest 
improvers, which is quite important additional evidence of their technology upgrading given that 
China is third ranked and Estonia 17th in terms of technological intensity. The biggest improver in 
terms of structural change is actually Portugal but it has also a fairly low technological intensity.  
The smallest structural changes can be observed for Russia and Germany but for quite different 
reasons. Germany is at the technology frontier and it may be expected that it will further specialize. 
In fact, several technology intensive and high income economies are located very low in terms of 
technology diversification (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Italy). Finland is quite specific in the sense 
that it is technology intensive economy but also with high degree of diversification of patent 
portfolio. As we would expect it has reached limits of diversification and thus has not further 
improved in that respect. Russia in contrast lost considerable ground in terms of frontier and 
domestic technological intensity, which seems to have been paralleled by a narrowing diversification 
of domestic technological activity as well as a massive drop in the share of high tech patenting.  
As outlined above our underlying approach is aimed to measure technology upgrading of middle 
income economies towards high income. This is clearly visible from changes in relative position in 
terms of structural change where five economies from the bottom group in terms of technology 
intensity are major diversifiers in expected direction while from the top group only China belongs to 
the biggest diversifiers. Germany as economy at technology frontier has reached saturation in that 
respect and has been actually specializing. So, within our framework indicators of structural change 
do not have a priory positive or negative interpretation. This depends on where countries stand in 
relation to the technology frontier.  
3. Global interaction in patenting inventions is composed of three indicators (FANI, COINV and NAFI 
rates) that indicate different stages and modes of interaction with global economy as countries are 
technologically upgrading. So, identical change in degree of openness should be interpreted in the 
context of technological level of economy and the actual mechanism of interaction. The biggest 
changes in terms of increased openness in patenting activities took place in Lithuania, Estonia, 
Luxemburg and Ireland while the biggest relative ‘withdrawals’ took place in Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Czech Republic and Spain. It is interesting to see that ‘globalizaton of technology’ is not universal 
process but evolves very unevenly reflecting very much country specific interactions between 
national technology systems and external environment.  
The Chinese system is quite autonomous given its high technology intensity and direction of 
structural change in patenting portfolio. Latvian technology system has generated in narrow 
technology area high technology intensity but unlike neighboring Lithuania it is actually very little 
open in terms of knowledge exchange. On the other hand, Finnish system is technology intensive, 
quite diversified and also very open by being ranked second in terms of interaction intensity. Also, 
Swedish system is quite open and relatively highly ranked in terms of both diversity of patent 
portfolio and technology intensity. Slovenia as very technology intensive economy has not opened in 
terms of knowledge exchange but it has actually closed further in relative terms. Italy as large EU 
economy has further ‘delinked’ while its technology intensity remains medium.   
With the exception of South Africa the BRICS have in relative terms not further opened up but 
actually have reduced their ranking positions in terms of global interactions at very different levels of 
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technology intensity. For example, China and India reduced the relative ranking positions in terms of 
global interaction with increasing technological intensity, whereas Russia lost relative ground in 
terms technological intensity as well as global interaction. This is contrasted by the development in 
South Africa, which also observed drop of its relative position in terms of technological intensity but 
at the same time score relatively higher in terms of global interaction. This raises interesting issues 
about the role of autonomy and openness in technology system in the catching-up process. However, 
our data only allows the interpretation of changing positions in global interaction in relative terms 
looking at EU and BRICS economies. Each of them may have become more or less open in their own 
terms as we observed above. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This report measures patterns of technology upgrading as three-dimensional process which consists 
of (i) intensity of technology upgrading, (ii) structural change, and (iii) interaction with the global 
economy. All three dimensions have strong grounding in the respective literatures on firm level 
technology upgrading, on structural change and growth, and on integration of technological activities 
in the global economy.  We compare countries in terms of technological levels and changes along 
their own upgrading paths as reflected in these three dimensions.   
The specificity of our report is that, considering the 3 dimensions, we depict patterns of technology 
upgrading by relying entirely on patent data. This has its major advantages in terms of length and 
consistency of time series derived as well as in the possibility to identify technological fields or 
specializations based on patent classifications.  
The indicators for intensity of technology upgrading trace technological capabilities at the technology 
frontier and behind the technology frontier. Transnational patent applications (TN) capture 
inventions pushing the technology frontier while resident direct patent applications to national 
patent offices dominantly proxy technology effort behind the technology frontier. It may be expected 
that as countries technologically upgrade their patent intensity increases and shifts form resident 
toward TN patents.  
Structural change in technological knowledge is depicted by using transnational patent applications 
in high technology fields and knowledge-intensive services and by a technological diversification 
index based on Herfindhal index of transnational patents across 35 technological fields. Drawing on 
Lee (20137) we assume that technology upgrading of middle income economies is depicted by 
increasing diversification of their technology profiles in terms of patents while this is not necessarily 
the case with high income economies.  
To capture interaction with global economy in the upgrading process we focus on technological 
knowledge sourcing across countries and interactions between foreign and indigenous actors. We 
draw on indicators developed by Guellec and van Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010). We apply them for 
exploring technology upgrading which leads to new perspectives in their interpretation.  Technology 
sourcing and the nature of interactions with foreign actors change from the catch up to the post 
catch up stage, which is reflected in patent indicators. We use three indicators. Foreign Applications 
of Native Inventions (FANI) measure the extent to which technological development in a country or 
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region is driven by foreign actors. International Co-invention in technological activities (COINV) 
measure international collaboration using patent applications with inventors residing in different 
countries. Native Applications of Foreign Inventions (NAFI) measure the extent to which a country is 
able to exploit technological knowledge from abroad. It may be expected that countries behind 
technology frontier do not have the organizational capabilities to exploit their own technological 
knowledge which is then exploited by foreign actors (high share of FANI), they increasingly interact 
with foreign partners for technology development (increasing COINV) but do not have the 
capabilities for exploiting foreign knowledge by themselves (smaller share of NAFI). As they are 
technology upgrading it may be expected that share of FANI declines, while shares of COINV and 
NAFI are increasing. 
 Based on these indicators and modes of interpretation our comparative analysis focuses on EU27 
and its subregions (EU-12, CEE and South EU) and on the BRICS countries. We identify the following 
developments.  
In terms of intensity of technology upgrading we observe different trends in the accumulation of 
technological capabilities at the technology frontier and behind the technology frontier, especially in 
what concerns CEE.  
On the one hand, all parts of the EU28 have increased their technological capabilities pushing the 
technology frontier.  TN patenting in the EU display strong growth from early 1990s and deceleration 
of this process after 2008. Within EU the data suggest a divergence on core (EU12) and periphery 
(CEE and South EU) countries which has been especially present until 2008 when patenting in the 
developed EU12 slows down.    
The comparison of CEE with BRICS suggests that in pc terms CEE has the highest TN patents in pc 
terms. However, CEE are well behind China in terms of TN per GDP or in technology intensity of 
economy as measured by TN patents. Nonetheless, CEE is ahead of other BRICs. In terms of 
technology intensity at the world frontier CEE has advanced but it is beset by structural issues as 
reflected by big difference between lower technology intensity of its economy vs. higher intensity of 
country.  
On the other hand, when it comes to technology effort behind technology frontier as measured by 
resident patents we observe a stagnant trend in EU28 and in its subregions. This may be expected 
given continuous economic and institutional changes towards European research area and effects of 
industrial networks in the EU. A strong decline of resident patents per GDP in CEE is the effect of 
their increasing internationalization and substitution of domestic technology effort by opening of 
their innovation systems.  
In terms of structural change, there is a shift towards HTKI areas in both EU South and CEE towards 
EU12 shares.  This is reflection of the strong convergence of both the EU South and CEE to the core 
which presumably means that the overall technological knowledge structure in the EU is becoming 
strongly determined by the EU core. However, a decline in share of HTKI areas at the EU12 level 
shows that technology path of EU is quite different from the US or East Asia. CEE falls clearly within 
BRIC spectrum in terms of share of HTKI patents.  
What concerns the diversification of patent portfolios, there is a clear trend towards diversification in 
BRICS and CEE except for China in terms TN patents and for India in terms resident patents. A 
diversification trends is feature of all CEECs despite their quite different starting levels of 
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concentration/diversification.  As we would expect, diversification is much less pronounced in 
resident patenting which largely reflect domestic and behind the frontier technology effort.  
With regard to technology upgrading and the interaction with global economy in terms of 
technology sourcing and interaction with foreign actors, the results for CEE match our expectations 
to some extent. Given our interpretation of FANI we would expect that successful technology 
upgrading would be reflected in decreasing FANI. Data for CEE and for BRICS are in line with this 
hypothesis. Within BRICS context CEE FANI rates seem quite stagnant reflecting possibly very weak 
endogenous organisational capabilities i.e a low share of domestic large firms in technology 
activities. Another strong feature of the CEE is a high share of coinventions. In all three sub-regions of 
the EU around 40% of all TN patents applications involve at least one foreign and one domestic 
inventor (COINV). Levels of technology co-generation are lower in BRICS than in the CEE and the rest 
of the EU which may be expected.  
Interestingly, NAFI Rates for EU regions show that technology sourcing abroad has initially declined in 
CEE and has remained stagnant and at comparatively very low level since mid-1990s while it has 
increased significantly at EU12 and South EU. NAFI, which in our context denote capacities for 
technology sourcing abroad, have been stagnant in BRICs which may seems surprising given the 
newly emerging literature and evidence on emerging markets MNEs. It seems that despite individual 
high profile cases of BRICS MNEs sourcing technology abroad, these cases do not yet represent trend 
or technology sourcing is not their key strategic orientation.  
To identify specific technology upgrading paths for the different regions and countries we develop 
technological upgrading profiles involving al indicators. These upgrading profiles have been used for 
the comparative analysis in 2011 and 1995. 
In 2011 CEECs were quite homogenous in their upgrading profiles which reflects their technological 
levels and relative distance to the EU-12. A typical CEE economy in 2011 is well behind EU12 in terms 
of frontier technology intensity, behind frontier technology intensity, share of high tech patents and 
technology sourcing abroad (NAFI). Moreover, its organizational capabilities are often less advanced 
as reflected in high share of FANI.  The CEE profile is much less coherent in terms of technology 
diversification/specialization and share of joint inventions. However, differences among CEECs are 
not significant in the sense that we can talk of distinct national technology profiles. Still there are 
some notable national features. Poland, Romania and Slovenia have above average domestic 
technological intensity which reflects partly their sizes (Romania and Poland) and specific model of 
innovation system reliant on domestic R&D intensive firms (Slovenia). Latvia and Lithuania are 
specific in terms of high share of HTKI patents. 
Technology upgrading profiles of BRICs and CEECs for 1995 are more diverse than for 2011 reflecting 
divergences and convergences among these catching-up economies. CEE had the least diversified 
technological knowledge portfolio with comparatively high frontier technological intensity.  By 2011 
CEE has lost its initial high ranking in terms of frontier technological intensity, has significantly 
diversified its technological knowledge, increased co invention rate but also became the region with 
the highest FANI rate which reflects weak organisational capabilities to commercialize its own 
inventions. On positive side, its technology profile has diversified as should be expected when 
countries are transiting from middle towards high income status. Also, its capacity for sourcing 
technology abroad has also somewhat improved. However, invention process in CEE has become 
much less intensive but it is now taking place in cooperation with foreign partners (COINV) who have 
organisational capabilities to commercialize local inventions (NAFI).  
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These changes in the CEE technology upgrading profiles contrast well with BRIC countries. Changes in 
profile of Russian technology upgrading have been similar but also much more dramatic when 
compared to the CEE. Its decline of frontier and domestic technological intensity has been much 
sharper than in the CEE. This loss of technology intensity of CEE has been compensated by stronger 
interaction with global economy through high coinvention rate which has not been the case in 
Russia.  
China’s profile of technology upgrading shows very strong increase in both domestic as well as in 
frontier technological intensity at the same share of high tech patents. On the other hand, 
technological upgrading was not followed by its increased technological openness. In this respect, a 
Chinese model of technology upgrading is quite different from the CEE which had to compensate its 
decreasing technological intensity by more technological openness.  
India has very low technological intensity which despite its high economic growth in this period has 
further shrank questioning whether its further growth can rely on technology or on other production 
factors. Similar to CEE, India has to compensate much less dramatic loss of technology intensity by 
increase knowledge cogeneration (COINV).  
Changes in Brazilian technology upgrading profile have been much less intensive when compared to 
China, Russia, and CEE. Relatively small decreases in technology intensity and in share of high tech 
patents have also resulted like in CEE and India to increases in knowledge cogeneration at relatively 
similar NAFI and FANI rates. South Africa followed similar pattern as its domestic and especially 
frontier technology intensity have declined as well as share of high tech patents. As in Brazil, CEE and 
India this has led to increases in co-invention rates and with slight changes in NAFI and FANI rates at 
unchanged degree of technology diversification. 
Finally, considering all EU28 economies plus BRICS we rank the countries according to each indicator 
in the years 1995 and 2011. By adding ranks we calculate one rank for each of the three dimensions. 
The goal is to identify relative changes in the rankings for each of the countries between 1995 and 
2011 in each dimension of technology upgrading.  
In terms of technology intensity, CEE (with exception of Slovenia) are firmly among the low 
performers (holing positions in second half of the ranking) together with South EU. This is expected 
given that drivers of their growth are not related to technology but to production capability. In this 
dimension BRICs are not a homogenous entity. Their positions in terms of technology intensity differ 
widely signaling very different opportunities for growth based on technology. China has increased by 
far the most due to remarkable increase of both TN and resident patents. 
In what concerns structural change, economies that are weak in terms of technology (patent) 
intensity show large changes in their benchmark position in terms of structural change. These results 
are in line with our assumption of structural change underlying technology upgrading of middle 
income economies towards high income. China and Estonia are again the biggest improvers in terms 
of ranking which is a quite important additional evidence of their technology upgrading given that 
China is third ranked and Estonia 17th in terms of technology (patent) intensity.  
The biggest changes in terms of increased openness in patenting activities took place in Lithuania, 
Estonia, Luxemburg and Ireland while the biggest relative ‘withdrawals’ took place in Italy, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Czech R and Spain. Our data shows that ‘globalizaton of technology’ is not universal process 
but evolves very unevenly reflecting very much country specific interactions between national 
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technology systems and external environment. Interestingly, four out of five BRICS (with exception of 
South Africa) have not further opened in terms of knowledge exchange in terms of patenting. This 
suggests that despite foreign presence in R&D in these economies, in particular China and India, this 
by itself has not led to relatively higher openness of their technology systems. 
In overall, our analysis puts the upgrading paths of the EU28 and CEE in the context of BRICS and 
shows strong and weak features of the CEE technology upgrading. Our research shows clearly that 
paths of technology upgrading are very country specific though differences among CEECs are 
relatively much less present than when compared to BRICS.  
CEECs are positioned relatively well in terms of technology intensity at the world technology frontier 
though their economic growth is not triggered by these type of technology activities. Our data 
indicate lower technology intensity of the CEE as economies (TN/GDP) vs. their relatively higher 
technology intensity as countries (TNCpc). This is an indication of mismatches in innovation systems 
of the CEECs especially regarding the relationships between technology activities in business and 
public sectors. These mismatches will need to be addressed so that the technology activities outside 
BES could be made more economically relevant.  
Nonetheless, CEE technology upgrading as depicted by patents is within the BRIC pattern (with 
exception of China which in terms of technology upgrading has de facto delinked from BRICS). In the 
BRIC context, the CEE characterize very open innovation system with a high share of coinventions 
and high FANI rates but also weak organizational capabilities to commercialize its own inventions. 
In terms of relative changes in technology upgrading CEE are firmly in the lower half of the EU28 list 
together with four out of five BRICS (except China and Slovenia). The only really big relative improver 
in terms of technology intensity is Estonia while other countries have recorded much less significant 
relative changes. Diversification of their technology profiles as proxy for technology upgrading of 
middle income economies is also well behind Chinese changes again with the exception of Estonia. 
The interaction of CEE with the global economy in terms of knowledge exchange interaction with 
global economy in overall is also not very strong again with exception of Lithuania and Estonia.  
In overall, CEE region shows good relative position in relation to BRICs but degree of changes in 
technology upgrading between 1995-2011 falls within BRIC (except China) spectrum. The biggest 
difference compared to BRICS is much higher openness of CEE in terms of patent generation and 
weak control of patenting process. We interpret this as reflection of weak organizational capabilities 
of the CEE larger local firms.  A specific position of the CEE as part of the EU has huge implications on 
how technology upgrading will evolve.  Also, given their size, the policy approaches to technology 
upgrading in the CEE are and will continue to be quite different when compared to BRICs. However, 
the challenge to couple domestic with foreign technology efforts is much more pronounced in this 
region than elsewhere. 
Finally, our analysis shows that technology upgrading is multidimensional construct and that aiming 
for aggregate composite indicator may actually mask the key issues which arise from different stages 
of technology upgrading in which countries find themselves and from their specific paths of 
technology upgrading. CEE grew during 1990s/2008 based on production, not technological 
capability. Their future growth will increasingly depend on building technological capabilities at world 
frontier level.  Our analysis shows that the basis for such growth exists only to a limited extent and 
that speed of upgrading towards world frontier activities is well beyond required for catching up. 
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Equally, our analysis shows that solutions for improved technology upgrading will need to be found 
with their existing innovation model of small open economies integrated into the EU. 
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